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-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ENID ALLEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 15415 
GREYHOUND LINES , INC. , 
a corpora ti on, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case for personal injuries allegedly sustained 
by the Plaintiff in Pocatello, Idaho on January 27, 1974 while 
she was a passenger on a Greyhound Bus which was traveling from 
Ogden, Utah to Dillon, Montana. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial before the court, the District Judge, the 
Honorable Ronald o. Hyde, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment for the Defendant. The court found that 
Plaintiff's claim was barred by the provisions of Section 5-219(4) 
Idaho Code Annotated, and therefore by the relevant provisions of 
Section 78-12-45 Utah Code Annotated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant prays that the judgment of the District Court 
be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees with most of Plaintiff's s tatement o: 
Facts. There are, however, several statements that deserve ch:' 
ification and elaboration: 
1. Plaintiff claims on pages 4 through 5 of her brief 
that it was never her intent to remain indefinitely in Montana. 
This unsupported allegation is in direct conflict with the recc: 
In its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the trial cour: 
found: 
12. Plaintiff and her husband moved from Ogden 
Utah to Dillon, Montana in August of 1972 to manage' 
and operate the motel business. At that time they , 
had an intention to remain in Montana for an indefinite 
period of time. (R. at 127) 
13. The management and operation of the motel 
required that plaintiff and her husband live in Dillon 
and be engaged full time in that business activity. 
However, they could have hired someone else to 
manage and operate the motel. Before and after they 
moved to Montana they have had the intention to manage 
and operate the motel and reside in the motel for an 
indefinite period of time. (R. at 127) 
* * * 
24. Plaintiff claims she will return to Ogden, 
Utah at some indefinite time in the future to reside. 
She also claims she will continue to reside for an 
indefinite period of time in Dillion, Montana, where 
she has a full-time business and home. (R. at 128) 
2. Plaintiff states at Page 4 of her brief that 5~ 
resided in an apartment in the motel she had acquired an interes 
in. It should be noted that the Plaintiff testified (R. at 61 ; I 
Tr. at 192, 220) and the court found (R. at 127) that she con-
sidered this residence "a regular home." 
. ·ff list Further Plaintl 
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her address in Dillon, Montana when she filled out a "new-patients" 
card for or. Charles M. Swindler, an Ogden physician, on February 
g, 1977. (R. at 241) 
3. Plaintiff states at page 5 of her brief that she 
obtained professional services in Ogden, Utah. However, plaintiff 
testified (R. at 72-73; Tr. at 195-197) and the court found (R. at 
127) that Plaintiff traveled to Ogden for medical and dental care 
because she felt that it was superior to that available in Dillon. 
Further, Plaintiff testified that except for family visits and 
medical treatments in Ogden, she would spend all of her time in 
Dillon. (R. at 75; Tr. at 195). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
WAS BARRED BY SECTION 5-219(4) IDAHO CODE ANNOTATED AND THEREFORE 
BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 78-12-45 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
It is well recognized that statutes of limitation are 
deemed procedural rather than substantive and that the law of the 
forum applies. Reference must be made to Utah law to determine 
i whether Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
Section 78-12-45 Utah Code Annotated provides in pertinent part: 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state 
or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the 
laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be 
maintained against a person by reason of a.lap~e 
of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained 
against him in this state, except in favor of one 
who has been a citizen of this state and who has 
held the cause of action from the time it accrued. 
This provision is a so-called borrowing statute. It 
;t provides that if a plaintiff files a cause of action in Utah 
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which arose in Idaho and which is barred by the Id h 
a o Statute 
of Limitations, then it is also barred in Utah, u 1 
n ess the acti 
is brought by a Utah citizen. If the action is brought bya 
citizen of any state other than Utah, it is barred in Utah. 
Borrowing statutes are enacted to prevent "forum shopping" and 
designed to "shorten the period of limitations applicable to 
actions arising in foreign jurisdictions if the foreign juris· 
dictions specify a shorter period". Long v. Pettinato, 230 N,:; 
2d 550 (Mich. 1975)' Pack v. Beech Air Craft Corp. I 132 A.2d s~ 
(Del. 1957), 53 CJS §31, Limitation of Actions. 
The parties stipulated and the district court took 
judicial notice that Idaho has a two-year statute of limitation 
for personal injuries. Section 5-219 (4) Idaho Code Annotated 
provides: 
5-219. Actions against officers, for penalties, or 
bonds, and for professional malpractice or for per-
sonal injuries.--Within two (2) years: 
* * * 
( 4.) An action to recover damages for professional 
malpractice, or for an injury to the person, or for 
the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another, including any such action arising from 
breach of an implied warranty or implied covenant; 
The Plaintiff in this case claims she was injured on 
January 27, 1974, in the State of Idaho. The State of Idaho 
· · · Clearly then, on the has a two-year statute of limitations. 
· ff i· s barred by the Idaho face of Plaintiff's complaint, Plainti 
by the r elevant provision; Statute of Limitations, and therefore 
of §78-12-45 Utah Code Annotated. 
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Plaintiff claims that she is a citizen of Utah and that 
therefore §78-12-45 does not bar her claim. However, an examination 
of the evidence in this case supports the court's findings and 
conclusion that Plaintiff was and is a citizen of the state of 
Montana. Therefore her claim is barred by the Utah Statute of 
Limitations, which barrows the two year Idaho Statute of Limitations. 
A. Citizenship is synonymous with domicile. 
There is no Utah case which discusses what constitutes 
s~te citizenship within the meaning of §78-12-45 Utah Code 
Annotated. Utah's provision is identical to Idaho's statute, 
which similarly does not have a discussion of the term state 
m citizenship. Consequently, it is necessary to examine other 
authorities for the elements of state citizenship. 
It is generally recognized that state citizenship is 
synonymous with domicile. Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 
1962), Webb v. Nolan, 361 F. Supp. 418 (N.C. 1972), Keelin v. 
~, 165 S.W.2d 232 (1942), Ogden v. Ogden, 33 So.2d 870 (Fla. 
1948). For example, the federal decisions uniformly hold that 
:t citizenship for determining diversity of citizenship jurisdiction 
is domicile. Kaufman and Broad, Inc. v. Gootrad, 397 F. Supp. 
ho 
1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), Webb v. Nolan, 361 F. Supp. 418 _(D. N.C. 
1972), Ellis v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. 325 F. 2d 996 (8th Cir. 
1964) • 
The case authority is consistant with 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
ini Domicile §11, which similarly states that citizenship is synony-
mous with domicile: 
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Where citizenship is used to refer to an · d' 
. d l' 1 . h. in lV· i ua s re ations ip to one of the states of th 
United States, the term is generally synonymouse 
with the term domicile, whether for the purpose 
~f ~et7rm~ning jurisdiction of a Federal Court, 
Jurisdiction of state courts over divorce or 
alimony actions, or any other purpose. On the 
other hand, citizenship when used in the sense of 
nationality, referring to an individual's rela-
tionship to a country may not be the same as 
domicile. Id. at 10. (Emphasis added) 
-
B. Domicile is based on residence and intent to remai 
for an indefinite period of time. 
It is important to observe the distinction between mer: 
residence and domicile. The court in Gootrad supra. , explains" 
To be a citizen of a state, a person must 
be domiciled in a state. Domicile is based on 
residence and an intention to remain for an 
indefinite period of time. Id. at 1055. (Emphasis 
added) 
American Jurisprudence states in similar terms: 
The intention necessary for acquisition of a 
domicile may not be an intention of living in the 
locality as a matter of temporary expediancy. It 
must be an intention to live permanently or indef-
initely in that place. But it need not be an 
intention to remain for all time; it is sufficient 
if the intention is to remain for an indefinite 
period. Supra at 19. (Emphasis added) 
It should be noted that domicile is presumed to follow residency 
as the court ruled in Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 492 P.2d 1208 (Ari: 
1972) : 
Domicile is presumed to follow residency and 
as actual residency is one circumstance, ~he 
presumption raised thereby is not conclusive, 
but is rebutable and the burden of proof to . 
rebut this resum tion is on the erson contentin 
the contrary. Id. at 1211. Emphasis added 
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c. Under Utah law, if a person has a residence and 
~rates a principal business in another state, he loses Utah 
~idency. 
In determining what constitutes residency, there is 
little Utah law available. However, as plaintiff states, Title 
20-2-14 (1) Utah Code Annotated provides: 
(f) If a person removes to another state with the 
intention of making it his principal place of bus-
iness, he loses his residence in this state. 
(g) If a person removes to another state with the 
intention of remainin there for an indefinite time 
as a place o permanent residence, he loses his 
residence in this state notwithstanding he entertains 
an intention of returning at some future period. 
(i) A change of residence can only be made by an 
act of removal joined with the intent to remain in 
another place. There can only be one residence. 
A residence cannot be lost until another is gained. 
D. Intent to acquire domicile is to be determined by 
the parties' conduct and declarations. 
While intention is important in determining domicile, 
it is clear that statements of intent are entitled to little 
weight when in conflict of the facts. Webb v. Nolan, 361 F. Supp. 
418 (D. N. C. 19 7 2) • For example, the court in Gardner v. Gardner, 
118 Ut. 496, 22 p. 2d 1055 (1950), ruled that intent is inferred from -
conduct as well as declarations: 
[T]he purchase of a home in another state is 
evidence which has a strong bearing on the question 
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of intention to abandon the existi'ng d · · 
_ omicile and 
to adopt one at the site of the home Id. at 501.* so acquir~· 
The court in Ellis v. New Amersterdan Cas. Co., 325 F. 2d 996 
(8th Cir. 1964) noted that there are numerous factors to consic 
in determining a party's intent to acquire domicile: 
Among the circumstances usually relied upon 
to 7s~ablish the requisite intent to establish 
domic7le are th7 ~eclarations of a party, the 
exercise of political rights, payment of personal 
taxes, a house of residence, and a lace of 
business. Id. at 801. emphasis added 
American Jurisprudence concurs in stating that intent 
is not to be determined merely from the stated intent of the 
parties. In determining that intent, courts look to (1) the 
exercise of voting or other civil and political rights in a 
certain place; ( 2) the payment of taxes which are generally 
deemed to be assessable at the domicile of the taxpayer; (3) th 
securing of licenses ordinarily required of residence, such as 
automobile licenses and business permits; (4) the place of one' 
business, profession or occupation; (5) where one owns the hous 
*The court in Gardner found that the purchase of a home in 
California was not conclusive evidence of a change of domi-
cile. Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, however, intent 
was not the controlling factor in the decision. Th7 co~rt 
found that there were many other factors, and that ii:i ":17w 
of all the facts, those factors outweighted the acquis1t1o~ s 
of a new home. Those factors included that: (l} the partie 
were in California only three weeks; (2) the partie7 had not 
moved into the new home, or established it as a residence, 
and would not do so until it was remodeled; (3} the major 
personal effects remained in Utah; and (4) the expressed 
intention of the plaintiff not to abandon her hc;>me ~n uta~~er 
Gardner at 118 Utah 501. Obviously, the situatioi:i in~ 
is different from the present case where the parties hav7 
a residence and operated a business for over four years in 
Montana. 
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in which he is living and/or the purchase of a residence in another 
state; (6) a person's church activities, his social life, and 
membership in social and fraternal organizations~ 25 Am. Jur. 
2a Domicile, §94-100. 
It should be emphasized that the intent need not be 
permanent. As Plaintiff notes in her brief, the RESTATEMENT 
(Second) of CONFLICTS, Section 18 (1970) provides: 
To acquire a domicile of choice in a place, 
a person must intend to make that place his home, 
for the time at least. (Emphasis added) 
From the foregoing then, it can be concluded that: 
1. Domicile is synonymous with citizenship. 
2. Domicile is based on residence and an intent to 
remain for an indefinite period of time. 
3. Under Utah law, if a person moves to another state 
with the intention of remaining there for an indefinite time as 
a place of permanent residence, he loses residence in Utah. 
Further, if a person moves to another state with the intention 
of making it his principal place of business, he loses his 
residence in this State. There can only be one residence. 
4. In determining whether a party has an intent to 
remain for an indefinite period of time, the courts look to the 
declaration of the party and his conduct including: 
(a) Where the party resides; 
(b) Where the party conducts or operates a 
business; 
(c) Where the party votes; 
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Where the party pays taxes; 
Where the party conducts social 
activities; 
or cominunit·' 
i 
(f) Where the party acquires state licenses and/;: 
permits; and 
(g) Where the party attends church. 
An examination of the record in this case demonstrates that the 
court correctly ruled that plaintiff is domiciled in the State c: 
Montana and is a citizen of that state: 
l. In August of 1972, the Plaintiff and her husband 
purchased an ownership interest in a motel in Dillon, Montana, 
(Tr. at 190-191; R. at 127). 
2. Plaintiff and her husband voluntarily moved from 
Ogden, Utah, to Dillon, Montana, in August of 1972, to manage anc 
operate the motel business. Plaintiff continually claims in her 
brief that "it was never her intent to remain indefinitely in 
Montana." (See Plaintiff's brief at p.5) However, the trial 
court's Findings clearly indicate that the Allens had an intentk 
to remain in Montana for an indefinite period of time. (R. at 
127-128) Those findings are presumed to be supported by the evidt 
and will not be disturbed on appeal, particularly when a party 
has not timely objected to the findings at the trial level. 
Westerfield v. Coop., 6 Utah 2d 262, 311 P.2d 787 (1957), ~ 
d 8 (1953) Further this court v. Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.2 11 · 
has ruled that where the trial court's findings and judgment 
'd e wewE 
"are based on substantial, competent, admissible evi enc ' 
not disturb them." Fisher v. Taylor, Osborn, _ P · 2d 
(Utah, 
Dec. 2, 1977) 
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3. The management and operation of the motel required 
that plaintiff and her husband live in Dillon and be engaged full 
time in that business activity. However, they could have hired 
someone else to manage and operate the motel. Before and after 
they moved to Montana, they have had the intention to manage and 
operate the motel and reside in the motel for an indefinite period 
of time. (Tr. at 195; R. at 127) 
4. From August, 1972, to the present, the Plaintiff 
and her husband have resided in a unit of the motel, which the 
plaintiff considered a "regular home." (Tr. at 192, 220; R. at 67, 
127) 
5. From August 1972, until trial, Plaintiff made occa-
sional visits to her family in Ogden, Utah. Plaintiff also 
obtained medical and dental treatment in Ogden, Utah, which 
Plaintiff deemed superior to that available in Dillon, Montana. 
Plaintiff's only reason to travel to Ogden is to visit family 
members and obtain medical treatment. (Tr. at 195-197; R. at 
71, 72) 
6. Plaintiff became a member of a ward of the L.D.S. 
Church in Dillon, Montana. (Tr. at 192; R. at 67, 127) 
7. Plaintiff became a member of the Dillon, Montana 
Relief Society. (Tr. 192; R. 67, 127) 
8. Since moving to Montana, Plaintiff has paid her 
tithing to the L.D.S. Church in Dillon, Montana. (Tr. at 192; 
R. 67 I 127) 
9. From August, 1972 until trial, Plaintiff and her 
husband have filed Montana State income tax returns· (Tr· at 194 i 
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R. at 70, 127) 
10. Plaintiff and her husband do not file a Utah 
State income tax return. (Tr. at 194; R. at 70, 128) 
11. Plaintiff and her husband have Montana State 
license plates on their automobile, and pay Montana s tate licen: 
fees and personal property taxes. (R. at 127) 
12. Plaintiff claims she will return to Ogden, Utah a: 
some indefinite time in the future to reside. She also claims 
she will continue to reside for an indefinite period of time in 
Dillon, Montana, where she has a full-time business and home. 
(Tr. at 195; R. at 128) 
In response to this evidence of Montana domicile, Plai:I 
relies on the fact that (1) she owns real property in Utah; (2) 
she obtains medical and dental treatment in Utah; and (3) she 
voted in Utah prior to 1972. Much of this reliance is misplacec 
To being with, the record shows that while Plaintiff owns a 
house in Utah, she does not reside there. The plaintiff's 
daughter and her daughter's husband reside in the house. 
(R. at 127) This is a significant fact. Under Utah law, there 
can only be one residence. Plaintiff has admitted that from rn: 
to the present her residence was Dillon, Montana. Therefore, 
Plaintiff cannot be domiciled in Utah because she does not 
reside in Utah. Plaintiff has chosen for an indefinite period 
of time to make her home, to reside, to operate her business, 
Wh'l' 
and to conduct social and religious activities in Montana. 1 ' 
h fact relll'· she has an indefinite intention to return to Utah, t e 
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and the court so found, that Plaintiff resides in Montana and 
has 50 resided from 1972 to the present. (R. at 127-128) 
The record further shows that obtaining Utah medical 
and dental treatment is not significant. The Plaintiff testified, 
and the court found, that Plaintiff simply thought that profes-
sional services in Ogden, Utah, were superior to that .in Dillon, 
Montana. (Tr. at 195-197, R. at 72, 73, 127) 
Plaintiff's final claim to Utah domicile is the fact 
that she voted in Utah after moving to Dillon. There is no question 
that this conduct is relevant evidence of intent to continue 
to be domiciled in Utah. However, that evidence is not dispositive 
when it is balanced against the evidence of Montana domicile. 
Plaintiff voted in Utah, but she resides in and operates a business 
in Dillon. Under Utah law, these two facts preclude Utah residence. 
Further, Plaintiff conducts social and religious activities in 
Dillon. She pays property and income taxes and she has obtained 
Montana automobile and business licenses. Plaintiff claims that 
many of these activities are not voluntary. This argument loses 
its substance when the court considers that Plaintiff voluntarily 
left Utah to reside and operate a business in Dillon. Plaintiff 
testified (Tr. at 195~ R. at 128) that she could hire someone 
else to manage the motel. However, Plaintiff voluntarily has 
chosen to operate the business herself. That voluntary choice 
to leave Utah and reside and operate a business in Dillon for 
over four years is hardly conducive to the Utah residence and 
d~icile plaintiff claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court should be aff' ' 
urned. : 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Respondent's 
Brief was served this day of December, 19 77, by mailing on 
said date a copy thereof by United States Mail, first class post· 
prepaid addressed to Richard Richards, Attorney for Appellant, 
2506 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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